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to command the forced labor of serfs, had to develop a new technique for securing manual labor. Legislation soon recognized the new state of affairs by enactments which kept distinct *la grande culture* and *la petite culture*. The former had to do with the production of sugar and coffee, from which the republic derived its wealth; the latter with small farming. *La petite culture* was simple cultivation of whatever the small owner wished to raise. Large-scale culture, on the other hand, became rather complicated.

Owners of great estates had to guide them only their experience of slave days and of serfdom under Toussaint and Dessalines. Now that both were gone, few planters were wealthy enough to pay wages for day labor; a new variation was needed. It was forthcoming in the *métayer* system—a crop-sharing arrangement with tenants closely resembling that which prevails today in some parts of the United States. The owner leased his estate in large or small plots to tenants. Half the income went to the landlord and half to the tenant; but the landlord must furnish the sugar mill and other necessary machinery where cane was raised. Laws were passed to give a measure of security to the proprietor. The contract between him and the tenant (*fermier*)[16] must be sign[illegible] before a civil official; the engagement must extend through the [illegible]vesting of one crop; tenants even then might not abandon their contracts except after notice of three months, with a declaration to the local official.

Punishments were stipulated for the breaking of contracts. A tenant who had made an agreement and then abandoned the *habitation*, even for a visit elsewhere, without a certificate attesting his regularity, might be imprisoned for eight days the first time, a month the second, and three months the third, such imprisonment to be spent in hard labor on public works. Any disputes arising between plantation owners and tenants were to be taken before the local justice. If they threatened to develop into serious cases, the justice was to notify the commandant of the nearest important town. A person who fomented disturbance of such agreements (the Haitian equivalent of "labor agitators," style 1810) might be imprisoned for a year, as also his accomplices. Commandants of each arrondissement must put down disorder as soon as requested by landlords, tenant farmers, or overseers. They must likewise make frequent patrols of

16. The word "fermier" must not be translated simply as "farmer"; the idea of a contract and a rental fee is implicit in the French word.

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their districts, principally during the working hours of the day. They were held responsible for all consequences of their own negligence.

This whole flow of legislation was designed primarily for the protection of the great landed proprietors, yet there were other laws which aided the masses. In former days workers had been coerced through corporal punishment. This was by law now abolished. Temporary assignments of garden plots were required for each family of laborers; medical care must be provided at the expense of the planter; the aged and infirm must be guaranteed the right to keep their homes and gardens even though no longer able to work. Expectant mothers in the fourth month of pregnancy must be relieved of field work, with no limitation of their right to share in the estate's income; mothers of nursing children must be permitted to remain at home until the weaning of their infants.

A great concession to the workers was made by abolishing the office of "inspector of cultures." In the days of Toussaint and Dessalines each district of the country had had its inspector, whose duty it was to see that crop cultivation proceeded according to schedule.[27] This man's disapproval of conditions resulted in fines and personal chastisement. By abolishing the office Pétion effected a great saving in salaries, for there had been thousands of these inspectors; on the other hand, the watchfulness of the inspectors had kept agricultural production at a high level. With no officials to dog the footsteps of the workers, crops immediately fell off.

Pétion clearly expected la grande culture to be the prevailing mode of agriculture in the republic. He fostered all kinds of legislation regulating it, even aside from that already mentioned. For example, a complete schedule was prepared for the division of income of the estate.[28] But the entire system was too neatly worked out and artificial to be effective, particularly since it was not backed up with force. The threat of punishment removed, most workers began gradually, often deliberately, to sabotage the system. It was much more pleasant

27. Christophe followed his predecessors in keeping the district inspectors.

28. This could be very complicated. A tenant farmer might hire workers, and so have to share his half of the income with them. In such cases, the division of the money crops was to be made in kind or in money, at current prices, in the presence of the local justice, his assessors, and an officer of the gendarmerie. The workers' "fourth" was divided into portions of which three went to the first foreman, two to each of the skilled workers, one and a half to each male or female worker, and one half to each child laborer between ten and fourteen years of age.

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applicant, of his regular conduct, and his ability to maintain himself economically in the town. Land laborers might not send their children to school or have them apprenticed in a town without a certificate from the same judge. Under no pretext might a worker establish a shop or sell his produce in the countryside; certain exceptions were made of necessary articles of food and home manufacture. No laborer might build a home in rural parts except on the plantation to which he was attached.

An individual, once placed by the government in the category of "cultivator," might never be removed from that class except by official authorization. Even with the consent of the proprietor and the agricultural administrator of the district, he was not to quit the estate to which he was bound for more than eight days.

We may further note in the Code that coöperative enterprise among the workers is forbidden. Anticipating the possible tendency of laborers to set up what in modern times would be called a producers' coöperative, presumably to lapse thereafter into laziness, the Code requires that every worker engage himself individually by authentic contract to the service of a proprietor or lessee. Such engagements for la grande culture are not to be for less than three years, or more than nine. Penalties for infractions of these rules are fines, imprisonment, or forced labor on public works in the chief town of the commune.

The Code directs the management of agricultural property and grazing establishments,[39] also the making of contracts between the proprietor and his hirelings. Rural police are established, in imitation of Christophe's Dahomets, to act as inspectors of plantations and of the workers on them.

The section repressing vagrancy is very full. All persons not proprietors or lessees, yet living in rural parts without having made a contract with some producer, are classed as vagabonds, to be arrested and taken before the magistrate. This official will warn them that by law they are bound to make a contract, and that if they refuse they will be sent to prison. Should a vagabond persist in refusing to sign a contract after eight days of confinement, he is condemned to labor on public works until he agrees. Should the prisoner be a minor, he will be sent to his parents.

39. This latter item was inserted as an adjustment to one of the primary occupations of the Spanish end of the island.

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by persuasion, to do as much work as possible for his and their own interests. In a few cases the success of such efforts was tolerably good; but one worker disposed to be sullen or idle, or even not physically strong, might throw the whole scheme into disorder. One's own profits would be cut by the misdeeds of others even when one had himself been industrious. This caused a decline of incentive, sometimes among a whole group of potentially good workers, because one or two of the number shirked. Probably the most patent evil of such arrangements was that every laborer realized that he did not suffer as directly for idleness or neglect as when working for himself; his fellow workers shared the consequences of his misconduct in some degree, and his employer in a still greater measure. The driving force of individual responsibility was removed.

Boyer and Inginac, foreseeing just such disorder, had tried to provide against it in the Code Rural by giving summary powers to local judges to inflict penalties upon lazy or malingering workers. Quite aside, however, from the loss of time and the inconvenience to both parties in going constantly to a judge for his decision, the proprietor was afraid to act on this principle to any extent, since if he did so he might lose his laborers altogether.

It was a rare proprietor, then, who could hope to make much of a fortune out of his plantation. More and more the landowners, having subdivided their fields, grew lax in overseeing them. The workers, freed from constant supervision, accustomed by long habit to living in one hut, and unconsciously developing a mentality which made them feel, as did American squatters on frontier lands, that they had a right to the land they tilled, imperceptibly developed into peasants. The state's remaining properties, no longer under cultivation, were invaded by families of small farmers, and the government took no steps to oust them or send them back to privately owned plantations. The estates of individual aristocrats underwent the same fate if not carefully watched. Theoretically, it was the duty of the army to drive out squatters, to force laborers back into "proper" agricultural work; but the army consisted of peasant youths who would not turn against people of their own group.

Legal irregularity was gradually sanctioned by the passage of time, usage being a stronger guarantor of rights than unenforced laws on the statute books.

Haitian peasantry, to sum up, began as the unplanned, undesired